Most mobile network operators generate revenues by directly charging users for data plan subscriptions. Some operators now also offer users data rewards to incentivize them to watch mobile ads, which enables the operators to collect payments from advertisers and create new revenue streams.
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the rapid growth of global mobile traffic, several leading analyst firms estimate that global mobile service revenue has nearly reached a saturation point. For example, Strategy Analytics forecasts that the global mobile service revenue will only increase by 3% between 2018 and 2021 [2] . As suggested in [3] , one promising approach for the mobile network operators to create new revenue streams is to offer mobile data rewards: the network operators reward users with free mobile data every time the users watch mobile ads delivered by the operators, and the operators are paid by the corresponding advertisers.
The data rewarding paradigm leads to a "win-win-win" outcome [3] . First, the operators monetize their services based on the mobile advertising, the global revenue of which was estimated to reach $80 billion at the end of 2017 [3] . Second, the advertisers gain incentivized advertising, where the rewards incentivize the users to better engage with ads and the advertisers allow the users to have more control over their experiences Manuscript received September 1, 2019; accepted November 9, 2019. This research was supported by the NSF grants AST-1343381, AST-1547328 and CNS-1701921. Some results in the paper were presented at IEEE INFOCOM, Paris, France, April 2019 [1] . (Corresponding author: Haoran Yu.)
The authors are with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60208, USA (email: yhrhawk@gmail.com; {ermin.wei, rberry}@northwestern.edu).
(e.g., whether and when to watch ads). According to surveys conducted by Forrester Consulting, IPG Media Lab, and Kiip, most mobile app users prefer to watch ads with rewards than to watch targeted ads [4] . Third, the users earn free mobile data to satisfy their growing data demand.
There has been an increasing number of businesses entering this space. Aquto and Unlockd are two leading companies that provide technical support for data rewarding (e.g., they develop mobile apps that display ads and track the amount of rewarded data). Aquto has collaborated with operators, such as Verizon and Telefonica [5] . Unlockd has collaborated with Tesco Mobile (in the United Kingdom), Boost Mobile (in the United States), Lebara Mobile (in Australia), and AXIS (in Indonesia) [6] . Other examples of operators that have offered data rewards include DOCOMO, Optus, and ChungHwa Telecom [7] , [8] . Furthermore, AT&T recently acquired AppNexus (a leading online advertising company) and will make a significant investment in the advertising business [9] . Offering mobile data rewards could become a natural and effective approach to further monetize an operator's mobile service.
We use an example in Table I to show that offering data rewards might lead to a significant revenue improvement for an operator. Suppose that an operator rewards 0.5MB of data per image ad. 1 If a user watches 40 image ads every day, 2 it can get 600MB of data after 30 days. When the CPM (cost per thousand impressions, also called cost per mille) is $8.2 [12] , the operator's corresponding ad revenue is $9.84. In other words, the operator gets $9.84 by rewarding 600MB of data to the user. As a comparison, the conventional data pricing is less profitable to the operator. As shown in [13] , operators only charge a user an extra $4 when the user switches from a 1GB data plan to a 2GB data plan.
Based on the eligibility of receiving rewards, there are two basic types of data rewarding schemes. In the Subscription-Aware Rewarding (SAR) scheme, the operators only allow the users who subscribe to the operators' existing data plans (with monthly fees) to watch ads for rewards. 3 In the Subscription-Unaware Rewarding (SUR) scheme, the operators reward all users for watching ads, regardless of whether the users subscribe to the data plans. 4 Intuitively, the SAR scheme leads to more subscriptions and the SUR scheme incentivizes more users to watch ads. The optimal design and comparison of the two schemes are crucial for realizing the full potential of the mobile data rewards, which motivates our work.
A. Our Contributions
We illustrate the data rewarding ecosystem in Fig. 1 . The purple arrows indicate that an operator charges the users for data plan subscriptions. The orange arrows indicate that the operator rewards the users for watching ads and gets payments from the advertisers.
We model the interactions among the operator, users, and advertisers by a two-stage Stackelberg game. In Stage I, the operator decides the unit data reward (i.e., the amount of data rewarded for watching one ad) for the users, and the ad price (i.e., the payment for purchasing one ad slot) for the advertisers. In Stage II, the users with different valuations for the mobile service make their data plan subscription and ad watching decisions. We consider a general data consumption utility function and a general distribution of user valuation. Meanwhile, the advertisers decide the number of ad slots to purchase, considering the advertising's wear-out effect (i.e., an ad's effectiveness can decrease if it reaches a user who has watched the same ad for several times [15] , [16] ).
We analyze the two-stage game for both the SAR and SUR schemes. In particular, we characterize the operator's optimal strategy that maximizes the total revenue from the data market and ad market. Our key findings in this work are as follows.
I. Design of Unit Data Reward (Theorems 2 and 3): Under both the SAR and SUR schemes, the operator should not always use up the available network capacity for data rewards.
Under the SAR scheme, increasing the unit data reward can lead to more data plan subscriptions and motivate more users to watch ads. However, it also allows a user to obtain a larger amount of data after watching a few ads. Hence, a user may watch fewer ads under a larger unit data reward. As a result, increasing the unit data reward may decrease the operator's revenue. Under the SUR scheme, (besides the above negative impact) increasing the unit data reward may lead to a loss in data plan subscriptions, and even generate a revenue that is lower than the revenue when the operator does not offer any data reward. In our work, we derive two sufficient conditions, under which the operator does and does not use up the capacity for data rewards, respectively.
II. Design of Ad Price (Theorems 1 and 4): Given the unit data reward, the operator's optimal ad price is affected by the wear-out effect if and only if the wear-out effect is small. If the wear-out effect is small, the operator should sell all ad slots and its optimal ad price should decrease with the wearout effect; otherwise, the operator should not sell all ad slots and its optimal ad price will be independent of the wear-out effect. Moreover, under the SUR scheme, the operator can differentiate the ad slots generated by the subscribers and non-subscribers when selling the ad slots to the advertisers and displaying the ads to the users. We numerically show that this can improve the operator's total revenue by up to 20.3%. Under the SUR scheme, both the subscribers and nonsubscribers watch ads. Since the subscribers also obtain data from the data plan, the subscribers and non-subscribers may watch different numbers of ads. Because of the advertising's wear-out effect, each advertiser has a different willingness to purchase the ad slots generated by the subscribers and nonsubscribers, and it is beneficial for the operator to differentiate these ad slots.
III. Choice of Rewarding Scheme (Theorem 5; Observations 1, 2, and 3): The operator's choice between the SAR and SUR schemes is heavily affected by the users' data consumption utility function and network capacity. When each user has a logarithmic utility function or each user has a generalized α-fair utility function [17] , if the network capacity is limited, the operator should apply the SUR scheme (i.e., reward both subscribers and non-subscribers); if the capacity is large, it should apply the SAR scheme (i.e., only reward the subscribers). When each user has an exponential utility: (i) under a large wear-out effect, the choice between the two schemes is similar to the logarithmic utility case; (ii) under a small wear-out effect, the operator should always apply the SUR scheme, regardless of the capacity.
Our comparison between the SAR and SUR schemes also provides insights for a more general problem, where the operator offers multiple data plans and decides whether to only allow the subscribers of the expensive data plans to earn rewards. Our analysis of the SAR and SUR schemes captures the key considerations of choosing these schemes (e.g., whether to motivate more subscriptions to the expensive data plans or incentivize more ad watching).
B. Related Work 1) Provision of Fee-Based and Ad-Based Services: There has been some work studying markets where providers offer both a fee-based service and an ad-based free service. For example, Riggins in [18] studied an online publisher that offers both the fee-based and ad-based versions of its website. In [19] , a Wi-Fi network provider allows users to either directly pay or watch ads to access the Wi-Fi network. In [20] , an app developer offers virtual items, and each app user will either pay or watch ads to obtain them in the equilibrium. In these studies, the fee-based and ad-based services are always substitutes, and each user chooses between these two options. In our work, their relation is more complicated, since a user may subscribe to the data plan and meanwhile watch ads for more data. Under the SAR scheme, increasing the reward for watching ads can increase the number of subscribers, which shows the complementary relation between the subscription and data rewards. Therefore, our work studies a novel structure, and derives new insights for the joint provision of fee-based and ad-based services. Furthermore, our work considers the operator's capacity for providing the service and the advertising's wear-out effect, which were not considered in [19] and [20] .
2) Sponsored Mobile Data: As studied in [17] , [21] - [23] , sponsored data provides another way for operators to create new revenue streams: content providers sponsor the data usage of their content, and users can access the content free of charge. There are several key differences between sponsored data and data rewards as studied here. First, the users can consume sponsored data only for the content specified by the content providers, while they can use reward data to access any online content. Second, with sponsored data, the content providers benefit from the users' data consumption on the corresponding content. With data rewards, the advertisers aim to deliver ads effectively, and do not benefit from the users' data consumption.
3) Other Related References: Other related work includes [24] - [26] . Bangera et al. in [24] conducted a survey, which shows that 76% of the respondents are interested in watching ads in exchange for mobile data. Sen et al. in [25] conducted an experiment to study the effectiveness of monetary rewards in increasing ads' viewership. Both [24] and [25] did not analyze the equilibrium strategies of the entities, such as operators, advertisers, and users. Harishankar et al. in [26] studied monetizing the operator's idle network capacity by providing users with supplemental discount offers, which are not related to advertising.
II. MODEL
In this section, we model the strategies of the operator, users, and advertisers, and introduce the two-stage game. We use capital letters to denote parameters, and lower-case letters to denote decision variables or random variables.
A. Network Operator
We consider a monopolistic operator, who offers a predetermined (monthly) flat-rate data plan (F, Q) to users. Parameter F > 0 denotes the subscription fee, and Q > 0 denotes the data amount associated with a subscription. 5 To derive insights into the data reward design, we focus on a single-operator, single-data plan scenario, which has been widely considered in literature (e.g., [17] , [23] ).
The operator decides two variables: (i) a unit data reward ω ∈ [0, ∞), which is the amount of data that a user receives for watching one ad; (ii) an ad price p ∈ (0, ∞), which is the price that the operator charges the advertisers for buying one ad slot. Here, we consider a price-based mechanism, where the operator sells the ad slots in advance at a fixed price. 6 
B. Users
We consider a continuum of users, and denote the mass of users by N . Let θ denote a user's type, which parameterizes its valuation for mobile service. We assume that θ is a continuous random variable drawn from [0, θ max ], and its probability density function g (θ) satisfies g (θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ [0, θ max ].
Let r ∈ {0, 1} denote a user's data plan subscription decision, and x ∈ [0, ∞) denote the number of ads that a user chooses to watch (during one month). We allow x and the advertisers' purchasing decisions to be fractional [19] , [28] . The amount of data that a user obtains from its subscription and ad watching is Qr + ωx. We use θu (Qr + ωx) to capture a type-θ user's utility of using the mobile service. Here, u (z) , z ≥ 0, is the same for all users, and can be any strictly increasing, strictly concave, and twice differentiable function that satisfies u (0) = 0 and lim z→∞ u (z) = 0. The concavity of u (z) captures the diminishing marginal return with respect to the data amount. Unless otherwise specified, our results are derived under a general u (z) that satisfies these properties. To study the impact of u (z)'s shape, we will also consider three concrete choices of u (z) used in the literature:
• Logarithmic function [29] , [30] : u (z) = ln (1 + z); • Generalized α-fair function [17] :
One reason for considering these is that the logarithmic function and generalized α-fair function are not upper bounded for z ≥ 0, while the exponential function is upper bounded. This difference will affect the optimal choice between the SAR and SUR schemes. For ease of exposition, we call u (·) a user's utility function (although the actual utility is θu (·)). 5 Compared with designing data rewards, the operator has less flexibility to adjust its data plan (e.g., subscribers may sign long-term contracts with the operator). Hence, we study the operator's reward design, given its existing data plan. In our future work, we plan to extend our analysis by jointly optimizing the data plan and reward. 6 The operator and advertisers usually have large-scale collaborations, e.g., an advertiser's ads are displayed around 300,000 times per promotion activity. In this case, the price-based mechanism facilitates the customization and communication process [27] . The operator can also sell the slots via the realtime auction, especially when it has some user profiles and the advertisers want to target different user categories [27] . We leave the study of heterogeneous advertisers and real-time auctions to future work.
A type-θ user's payoff is
where F is the subscription fee, and Φ > 0 denotes a user's average disutility (e.g., inconvenience) of watching one ad. We assume that the total disutility of watching ads linearly increases with the number of watched ads [20] , [32] . In Sections III-A and IV-A, we will analyze the users' optimal decisions r * (θ, ω) and x * (θ, ω). Next, we introduce two notations to capture the total number of ad slots created by users. Let N ad (ω) denote the mass of users with x * (θ, ω) > 0 (i.e., who watch ads), and let y be the value of x * (θ, ω) chosen by one of these N ad (ω) users. Because these N ad (ω) users may have different types θ, they may have different values of x * (θ, ω), i.e., watch different numbers of ads. Therefore, y is a random variable. The distribution of y gives the distribution of the number of ads watched by a user given that the user watches ads. 7 The expected total number of created ad slots is simply the expected total number of ads watched by the users, given by E [y] N ad (ω).
C. Advertisers
We consider K homogeneous advertisers. When N ad (ω) > 0, we assume that to display the ads to a user, the operator randomly draws ads from all the E [y] N ad (ω) ad slots without replacement.
Suppose an advertiser purchases m ∈ [0, ∞) ad slots from the operator (in Sections III-C and IV-C, the operator will choose its ad price p to ensure that the total number of sold ad slots does not exceed E [y] N ad (ω)). If a user watches y ads, on average, my E[y]N ad (ω) ads among the y watched ads belong to this advertiser. We let ψ (m, y, ω) denote the overall effectiveness of the advertiser's advertising on the user (e.g., a large ψ (m, y, ω) implies that the user has a good impression of the advertiser's product). We model ψ (m, y, ω) by
where B > 0 and A ≥ 0 are parameters. Eq. (2) means that ψ (m, y, ω) is quadratic in my E[y]N ad (ω) . This reflects the advertising's wear-out effect: the advertising's effectiveness may first increase and then decrease with the number of ads delivered by this advertiser to the user. This is because too much repetition may lead the user to have a bad impression of the product. The wear-out effect has been widely observed in the literature [15] , [16] . Some studies, such as [33] and [34] , explicitly considered a quadratic relation between the ad repetition and the advertising's effectiveness, which is similar to (2) . Note that a larger A in (2) reflects a stronger degree of wear-out effect. 8 We define an advertiser's utility as the expected total value of its advertising's effectiveness on all users. If a user does not see the advertiser's ads, the advertising's effectiveness on the user is zero. Therefore, an advertiser's utility is simply E y [ψ (m, y, ω)] N ad (ω). Considering the advertiser's payment for purchasing m ad slots, the advertiser's payoff is
Note that E [y] N ad (ω) and E [y] N ad (ω) 2 in the denominators on the right-hand side of equality (a) are deterministic. When N ad (ω) = 0, we simply define Π ad (m, ω, p) −mp, and it is easy to see that the advertiser will not purchase any ad slot in this case.
D. Two-Stage Stackelberg Game
We model the interactions among the operator, users, and advertisers by a two-stage Stackelberg game. In Stage I, the operator decides the unit data reward ω and ad price p. In Stage II, each type-θ user chooses the subscription decision r and the number of watched ads x, and each advertiser decides the number of purchased ad slots m. 9 We assume that the users' maximum valuation θ max satisfies
. Similar assumptions about the range of users' attributes have been made in [35] - [37] . As shown in Sections III and IV, this assumption implies that the highvaluation users may both subscribe to the data plan and watch ads under a small reward ω. In fact, we can easily see that the user equilibrium under θ max ≤ u (0)F u (Q)u(Q) will be a special case of that under θ max > u (0)F u (Q)u(Q) . We summarize our paper's key notations in Appendix A.
III. SUBSCRIPTION-AWARE REWARDING
In this section, we analyze the two-stage game under the SAR scheme, i.e., the operator only allows the subscribers of the data plan to watch ads for rewards. Note that we do not study the scheme which only rewards the non-subscribers for watching ads. This scheme is less reasonable in practice, i.e., the subscribers should not have a lower priority of using the service than the non-subscribers.
A. Users' Decisions in Stage II
Given ω, a type-θ user solves the following problem: where Π user (θ, r, x, ω) is given in (1) , and x = xr implies that a user can watch ads (x > 0) only if it subscribes (r = 1). 9 If we break Stage II into two stages and consider the sequential decision making of the advertisers and users, the game's outcome will not change. This is because given the operator's unit data reward, the users' decisions are not directly affected by the advertisers' decisions. Hence, the advertisers can anticipate the users' decisions, regardless of their decision sequence. We use (u ) −1 (·) to denote the inverse function of u (·). In Lemma 1, we introduce several thresholds of θ, which will be used to characterize the users' decisions (due to space limits, we leave all proofs in our appendices).
ωθ − Q = 0, and we denote it by θ 2 .
Although θ 1 , θ 2 in Lemma 1 (and θ 3 , θ 4 in Lemma 2) are functions of ω, we omit this dependence in the notation to simplify the presentation. Based on these thresholds, we characterize the users' decisions in the following proposition. Proposition 1. Under the SAR scheme, the optimal decisions of a type-θ user (θ ∈ [0, θ max ]) are as follows: 10 Case A: When ω ∈ 0,
In Fig. 2 , we illustrate the data that users with different valuations θ obtain from data plan subscriptions (i.e., Qr * (θ, ω)) and watching ads (i.e., ωx * (θ, ω)).
In Case A, only the users with θ ≥ θ 0 subscribe, and no user watches ads because of the small unit data reward ω.
In Case B, the users who subscribe are the same as those in Case A. Users with θ ≥ θ 1 watch ads, and the threshold θ 1 decreases (i.e., more users watch ads) as ω increases. Next, we focus on the users with θ ≥ θ 1 . We can show that the number of watched ads x * (θ, ω) increases with θ (note that 10 Here, 1 {·} denotes the indicator function. It equals 1 if the event in braces is true, and equals 0 otherwise.
(u )
−1 (·) is decreasing because of the strict concavity of u (·)). In particular, the marginal increase of x * (θ, ω) with respect to θ is affected by the utility function u (z):
• If u (z) = ln (1 + z), we can show that x * (θ, ω) linearly increases with θ (as illustrated in Fig. 2 );
In Case C, more users subscribe compared with Cases A and B, i.e., the subscription threshold θ 2 is smaller than θ 0 . This is because the unit reward ω is large and users with θ ∈ [θ 2 , θ 0 ) subscribe to be eligible for the data rewards. In Appendix D, we prove that θ 2 decreases (i.e., more users subscribe) as ω increases. Moreover, each subscriber watches a positive number of ads, i.e., x * (θ, ω) > 0 for θ ≥ θ 2 .
Based on these results, we can see one key advantage of the SAR scheme: it leads to a large number of data plan subscriptions.
B. Advertisers' Decisions in Stage II
Given p and ω, each advertiser solves the following problem:
where the payoff Π ad (m, ω, p) is given in (3) . We characterize the optimal number of purchased ad slots in Proposition 2. N ad (ω) .
Recall that the random variable y denotes the value of x * (θ, ω) when x * (θ, ω) > 0, and N ad (ω) is the mass of users watching ads. In (6) , m * (ω, p) decreases with the degree of wear-out effect A. Moreover, since E y 2 = (E [y]) 2 +Var [y],
we can see that m * (ω, p) decreases with Var [y] (i.e., the variance of y). This implies that the advertisers prefer a low variation in the number of ads watched by each of the N ad (ω) users. The reason is that the advertising's effectiveness is concave in y given E [y] (as shown in (2)). Given the concrete utility function u (·) and the distribution of θ, we can derive x * (θ, ω) based on Proposition 1, and further compute E [y], E y 2 , and N ad (ω) in (6) . We give an example as follows. 
. Based on Proposition 1, the users' ad watching decisions are characterized as follows:
where
. Hence, only the users with θ ≥ θ 1 watch ads. Since θ is uniformly distributed in [0, θ max ], we can further compute N ad (ω) as follows:
According to (7) and the fact that θ ∼ U [0, θ max ], the number of ads watched by one of the N ad (ω) users is uniformly distributed in 0, θmax−θ1 Φ . This implies that y is uniformly distributed in 0, θmax−θ1 Φ . 11 Then, we can compute E [y] and E y 2 as follows:
Based on Proposition 2, we can derive m * (ω, p) as follows:
In Appendix F, we compute m * (ω, p) for other values of ω (i.e., ω that satisfies Cases A or C) under the logarithmic utility function and uniformly distributed user types.
C. Operator's Decisions in Stage I
The operator obtains revenue from both the mobile data market and ad market. In the mobile data market, each user who subscribes to the data plan should pay F to the operator. The operator's corresponding revenue is
In the ad market, each advertiser pays p for each purchased ad slot. The operator's corresponding revenue is
Let D (ω) denote the total data demand, i.e., the total amount of mobile data that users request (by subscription and watching ads) under reward ω. We can compute D (ω) as
where Qr * (θ, ω) and ωx * (θ, ω) are illustrated in Fig. 2 .
Based on R data (ω), R ad (ω, p), and D (ω), we formulate the operator's problem as follows:
Here, R total (ω, p) is the operator's total revenue. Constraint (15) implies that the total data demand D (ω) cannot exceed a capacity C [17] , [23] . To ensure that choosing ω = 0 (i.e., no data reward) is feasible to the problem, we assume that C ≥ D (0). Here, D (0) is the data demand when the operator only 11 Strictly speaking, x * (θ 1 , ω) = 0 and hence only the users with θ > θ 1 will watch ads. As a result, y should be uniformly distributed in 0, θmax−θ 1 Φ . However, the probability that θ = θ 1 is zero due to the continuous distribution of θ. Therefore, we can consider users with θ ≥ θ 1 when counting N ad (ω) and treat y as a variable uniformly distributed in 0, θmax−θ 1 Φ without affecting our analysis.
offers the data plan without any data reward. Constraint (16) implies that the total number of sold ad slots (i.e., Km * (ω, p)) should not exceed the number of available ad slots. When the operator does not sell all ad slots, it can fill the unsold slots with content like public news and pictures to guarantee the fairness among the users choosing to watch ads (e.g., Optus displayed wallpapers to users when there were unsold ad slots [38] ).
To solve (14)-(16), we first analyze p * (ω), which is the optimal ad price under a given ω. Then, we substitute p = p * (ω) into R total (ω, p), and analyze the optimal unit data reward ω * . We characterize p * (ω) in the following theorem.
Note that the random variable y is the value of x * (θ, ω) when x * (θ, ω) > 0. Hence, both E y 2 and E [y] depend on ω.
If ω ∈ 0, Φ u (Q)θmax , no user watches ads (based on Proposition 1). In this case, the advertisers do not purchase ad slots, regardless of the ad price p.
, the wear-out effect is small, and the advertisers have high willingness to purchase ad slots. Hence, the operator chooses p * (ω) = B − 2AE[y 2 ] KE[y] to sell all the ad slots (which leads to Km * (ω, p * (ω)) = E [y] N ad (ω)).
4E[y 2 ] , the large wear-out effect decreases the advertisers' willingness to purchase slots. The operator will not sell all slots, and will choose p * (ω) = B 2 , which is independent of A.
Next, we analyze ω * , which maximizes R total (ω, p * (ω)), subject to D (ω) ≤ C. We first introduce Proposition 3.
Based on Proposition 3, we can rewrite D (ω) ≤ C as ω ≤ D −1 (C). From numerical experiments, R total (ω, p * (ω)) is either always increasing or unimodal in ω ∈ [0, ∞). Hence, we can easily search for ω * in the interval 0, D −1 (C) (e.g., when R total (ω, p * (ω)) is unimodal, we can apply the Golden Section method [39] ). Next, we study when the operator will choose ω to be D −1 (C), i.e., use up the network capacity for data rewards. In Theorem 2, we show a sufficient condition under which ω * = D −1 (C).
the operator's optimal unit data reward is given by ω * = D −1 (C).
We explain this sufficient condition by discussing the unit data reward ω's influence on R data (ω) and R ad (ω, p * (ω)).
First, increasing ω can increase R data (ω), because more users subscribe. Second, increasing ω has the following impacts on R ad (ω, p * (ω)): (i) (positive impact) It increases N ad (ω), i.e., more users watch ads; (ii) (negative impact) It may decrease E [y]. Under a larger ω, a user can obtain a larger amount of data after watching a few ads. Then, the user's willingness to watch more ads may decrease because of the concavity of the utility function; (iii) (negative impact) It may increase Var [y]. Under a larger ω, more users with different valuations θ watch ads, which can increase the variance of y. As discussed in Section III-B, increasing Var [y] decreases the advertisers' willingness to purchase ad slots. Under a general utility function u (·) and a general distribution of θ, it is challenging to analyze the net effect of the above impacts. Theorem 2 implies that when both (E[y]) 2 E[y 2 ] N ad (ω) and E [y] N ad (ω) increase with ω, the positive impact dominates the negative impacts. In this case, the operator should set ω as large as possible without violating the capacity constraint (15) under the SAR scheme.
A widely considered setting is that each user has a logarithmic utility function (e.g., [29] , [30] ) and a uniformly distributed type (e.g., [19] , [36] ). We can verify that this setting satisfies the sufficient condition in Theorem 2, and hence we have the following proposition.
Proposition 4. When u (z) = ln (1 + z) and θ ∼ U [0, θ max ], the operator's optimal unit data reward is given by ω * = D −1 (C).
When each user has an exponential utility function (i.e., u (z) = 1 − e −γz ), E [y] N ad (ω) may decrease with ω and ω * can be smaller than D −1 (C) (i.e., the operator does not use up the capacity for rewards). We show an example in Appendix K.
IV. SUBSCRIPTION-UNAWARE REWARDING
In this section, we consider the SUR scheme, i.e., both the subscribers and non-subscribers can watch ads for rewards.
A. Users' Decisions in Stage II
Since the users can watch ads without subscription, each type-θ user simply chooses r and x to maximize its payoff without the constraint x = xr, as in (4) in Section III-A.
In Lemma 2, we introduce two new thresholds of θ.
Based on the thresholds introduced in Lemmas 1 and 2, we characterize the users' decisions in the following proposition (we use symbolˆto indicate that the results are obtained under the SUR scheme).
Proposition 5. Under the SUR scheme, the optimal decisions of a type-θ user (θ ∈ [0, θ max ]) are as follows: CaseÂ:
The users' optimal decisions in CasesÂ andB are the same as those in Cases A and B (under the SAR scheme), respectively. Hence, in Fig. 3 , we only illustrate the data obtained by users via subscription (i.e., Qr * (θ, ω)) and watching ads (i.e., ωx * (θ, ω)) in CasesĈ andD.
In CaseĈ, two segments of users watch ads: users with valuations θ ≥ θ 1 watch ads and subscribe; users with valuations θ 3 ≤ θ < θ 4 watch ads without subscription. We characterize the properties of θ 4 in the following lemma.
In CaseB, the subscription threshold is θ 0 . Hence, result (i) of Lemma 3 implies that some low-valuation users who subscribe in CaseB become non-subscribers in CaseĈ. This is because these low-valuation users' marginal benefit of consuming data decreases after earning the data rewards, and it is no longer beneficial for them to subscribe to the data plan in CaseĈ. Result (ii) of Lemma 3 shows that more subscribers become non-subscribers as the unit reward increases.
In CaseD, since ω is large, all users simply watch ads to earn the rewards, without paying for the subscription. (b) FunctionR total (ω,p * (ω)). 
B. Advertisers' Decisions in Stage II
Compared with the SAR scheme, the SUR scheme changes each advertiser's optimal decision through changing the mass of users watching ads and the distribution of the number of ads watched by each of these users.
Givenr * (θ, ω) andx * (θ, ω) in Proposition 5, we can computeN ad (ω) (i.e., the mass of users watching ads) and the distribution ofŷ (i.e.,x * (θ, ω)'s value whenx * (θ, ω) > 0). To computem * (ω, p), we can simply replace N ad (ω), E [y], and E y 2 in Proposition 2 byN ad (ω), E [ŷ], and E ŷ 2 .
C. Operator's Decisions in Stage I
Based onr * (θ, ω),x * (θ, ω), andm * (ω, p), we can com-puteR data (ω),R ad (ω, p), andD (ω) in a similar manner as in (11)-(13). The operator's problem in Stage I is then given by:
which is similar to problem (14)- (16) .
To solve (18)-(19), we first computep * (ω), i.e., the optimal ad price under a given ω. The analysis ofp * (ω) is similar to that of p * (ω) in Theorem 1 under the SAR scheme. We can prove that if ω ∈ 0, Φ u (Q)θmax , no user watches ads and hence any positive ad price is optimal; otherwise, we havê
.
Then, we computeω * by maximizingR total (ω,p * (ω)), subject toD (ω) ≤ C. The computation ofω * is different from that of ω * under the SAR scheme, because (i)
, increasing ω reduces the number of data plan subscribers, which may decreaseD (ω). Moreover, when ω increases to ΦQ F , all data plan subscribers quit their subscriptions and the distribution of users' ad watching times also changes. This leads to the discontinuity of R total (ω,p * (ω)) at ω = ΦQ F . We illustrate examples ofD (ω) andR total (ω,p * (ω)) in Fig. 4 (a) and Fig. 4 (b), respectively.
We can computeω * as follows. First, we search for ω's feasible region, whereD (ω) ≤ C. We can numerically show that ω's feasible region consists of at most three intervals. Then, we can show thatR total (ω,p * (ω)) is either monotone or unimodal in each interval. 12 Hence, we can determineω * by comparing the local optimal unit data rewards found in these intervals.
Under the SAR scheme, the operator always uses up the capacity for rewards if u (z) = ln (1 + z) and θ ∼ U [0, θ max ]. Under the SUR scheme, this does not hold, and a large ω may even generate a total revenue that is lower than the revenue when the operator does not offer any reward. This is because a large ω may reduce the number of subscribers (as shown in CaseĈ) and hence decreaseR data (ω). Next, we characterize a sufficient condition under which the network capacity is not used up for rewards (given general u (z) and g (θ)). 
When the operator has a large capacity and the wearout effect is large, using up the capacity for rewards will significantly decreaseR data (ω) and will not significantly increaseR ad (ω,p * (ω)). Hence, we haveD (ω * ) < C in this situation. We can show that both thresholds N (u ) −1 F θmaxQ and B 2 K 8F θmax θ 0 g(θ)dθ decrease with F (i.e., the subscription fee). Intuitively, if the data plan is expensive, the operator should not use up the capacity for rewards under the SUR scheme.
D. Extension: Differentiation of Ad Slots
In the above analysis, we assume that the operator does not differentiate the ad slots generated by the users. It sells all ad slots to the advertisers at the same price, and randomly draws ads from all ad slots when a user watches ads. Under the SUR scheme, the ad slots can be generated by both the subscribers and non-subscribers. In this section, we consider the differentiation of these two types of ad slots, 13 which affects both the pricing and ad display rule. The operator can sell these two types of ad slots at different prices. When a subscriber or non-subscriber watches ads, the operator draws ads only from the corresponding type of ad slots (e.g., if an advertiser only purchases the ad slots generated by the subscribers, its ads will only be seen by the subscribers).
Given ω, we useN ad I (ω) andN ad II (ω) to denote the number of the subscribers that watch ads and the number of the nonsubscribers that watch ads, respectively. Let random variableŝ y I andŷ II denote the numbers of ads watched by one of these subscribers and one of these non-subscribers, respectively. Similar to Proposition 2, we have the following results:
• For the ad slots generated by the subscribers, the operator can set a price p I > 0. IfN ad I (ω) > 0, the number of these slots purchased by each advertiser ism *
• For the slots generated by the non-subscribers, the operator can set p II > 0. IfN ad II (ω) > 0, the number of these slots purchased by each advertiser ism *
Constraint (22) means that the total number of sold ad slots that correspond to the subscribers should not exceed the number of ad slots generated by the subscribers. Constraint (23) can be explained similarly for the non-subscribers. In fact, only when ω satisfies CaseĈ in Proposition 5, both the subscribers and non-subscribers watch ads (i.e.,N ad I (ω) ,N ad II (ω) > 0), and problem (20)-(23) is different from problem (18)-(19) (i.e., the problem without differentiation). In the remaining cases, problem (20)-(23) reduces to problem (18)- (19) .
We define Π SUR R total (ω * ,p * (ω * )), which is the optimal objective value of problem (18)- (19) . Let Π SURD denote the optimal objective value of problem (20)-(23), i.e., Π SURD is the operator's optimal total revenue under the SUR scheme with differentiation. We compare Π SUR and Π SURD in the following theorem.
Theorem 4. We always have Π SURD ≥ Π SUR . 13 Besides the subscription decision r, a user decides x, e.g., the number of ads to watch within a month. Different from r, the operator does not precisely know the user's decision of x until the end of the month. If the operator can estimate x's range based on the user's historical behavior, it can classify users into different categories and differentiate the corresponding ad slots similarly.
Hence, differentiation does not decrease the operator's optimal total revenue (given general u (z) and g (θ)). In general, it is easy to show that allowing a seller to sell items at different prices does not decrease its revenue. However, the differentiation here affects the ad display rule as well as the pricing, so it is non-trivial to prove Theorem 4. For example, one conjecture is that given any (ω, p) which is feasible to (18)- (19) , the operator can choose the same ω and set p I = p II = p in (20)- (23) to ensure that the value of objective (20) is no smaller than that of (18) . In fact, the conjecture does not hold, because (ω, p I , p II ) may be infeasible for (20)- (23) .
Intuitively, if the optimal unit data reward satisfies CaseĈ and the distributions ofŷ I andŷ II are significantly different, the gap between Π SURD and Π SUR will be large. In the next section, we will show this gap numerically.
V. COMPARISON BETWEEN REWARDING SCHEMES
We define Π SAR R total (ω * , p * (ω * )), which is the operator's optimal total revenue under the SAR scheme. In this section, we compare Π SAR , Π SUR , and Π SURD . Since the comparison is challenging under a general user type distribution and a general utility function, we focus on specific user type distributions and utility functions. In Sections V-A and V-B, we consider uniformly distributed user types and truncated normally distributed user types, respectively.
A. Uniformly Distributed User Types
In this section, we assume that each user's type θ follows a uniform distribution. We will consider logarithmic utility, generalized α-fair utility, and exponential utility.
1) Logarithmic Utility Function: We assume that u (z) = ln (1 + z). Theorem 5 characterizes the analytical comparison between different schemes as C → ∞.
Theorem 5 implies that if the operator has sufficiently large network capacity, it should only reward the subscribers for watching ads. Intuitively, this allows the operator to motivate all users to subscribe and watch ads via high data rewards. It maximizes the operator's revenue from both the data market and the ad market.
Under a finite network capacity C, none of Π SAR , Π SUR , or Π SURD has a closed-form expression, and their analytical comparison is challenging. Next, we compare them numerically. In the numerical experiment, we choose N = 10 7 , F = 30, Q = 0.8, θ ∼ U [0, 155], Φ = 0.3, K = 23, A = 0.6, and B = 5. Here, we consider an area with 10 million users. In Appendix R, we consider different parameter settings (e.g., different values of N ), and the key observations summarized in this section still hold under those settings.
In Fig. 5 (a), we plot Π SAR , Π SUR , and Π SURD against C. We can see that only Π SAR strictly increases with C. As shown in Proposition 4, when each user has a logarithmic utility and a uniformly distributed type, the operator always uses up the capacity for rewards under the SAR scheme. Hence, the operator can always benefit from C's increase in this situation. (c) Exponential Utility (Large A). First, we compare Π SAR and Π SUR . When C is close to D (0), Π SAR and Π SUR are equal. In this situation, the operator can only choose a very small unit reward ω. As shown in Case B in Proposition 1 and CaseB in Proposition 5, the users' optimal decisions under the two schemes are the same, which leads to the same operator's revenue. When C is from 0.84 × 10 7 to 1.54 × 10 7 , Π SAR is smaller than Π SUR . This is because the SUR scheme can motivate two segments of users to watch ads (by setting ω ∈ Φu(Q) F u (0) , ΦQ F , as shown in CaseĈ in Proposition 5), which generates a higher ad revenue than the SAR scheme. When C is greater than 1.54 × 10 7 , Π SAR is greater than Π SUR . The operator will fully utilize the large network capacity under the SAR scheme, and set a large ω to motivate more users to both subscribe and watch ads. This is consistent with Theorem 5 (i.e., if C → ∞, then Π SAR > Π SUR ). We summarize the results in Observation 1 (the comparison between Π SAR and Π SURD is similar to the comparison between Π SAR and Π SUR ).
Observation 1. When u (z) = ln (1 + z), if C is small, the SUR scheme achieves a higher operator's revenue; otherwise, the SAR scheme achieves a higher operator's revenue.
Second, we compare Π SUR and Π SURD . When C = 1.24 × 10 7 , Fig. 5 (a) shows that the ad slots' differentiation can improve the operator's revenue under the SUR scheme by 9.4%. This is because the value ofω * under the SUR scheme satisfies CaseĈ in Proposition 5, which implies that both subscribers and non-subscribers watch ads. Moreover, the subscribers and non-subscribers have quite different ad watching behaviors. In Fig. 6(a) , we illustrate the distributions ofŷ I (i.e., the number of ads watched by a subscriber) andŷ II (i.e., the number of ads watched by a non-subscriber) when C = 1.24 × 10 7 and the operator uses the SUR scheme. We can see that bothŷ I andŷ II follow uniform distributions, but their mean values are significantly different.
2) Generalized α-Fair Utility Function: We assume that
We choose α = 0.8 and µ = 0.8, and the other settings are the same as those in Fig. 5(a) . In Fig. 5(b) , we plot Π SAR , Π SUR , and Π SURD against C. We can see that the comparison among the operator's optimal revenues under different schemes is similar to that in Fig. 5(a) . We summarize the key results about the comparison between Π SAR and Π SUR in the following observation.
if C is small, the SUR scheme achieves a higher operator's revenue; otherwise, the SAR scheme achieves a higher operator's revenue.
3) Exponential Utility Function:
We assume that u (z) = 1 − e −γz , and choose γ = 0.7, N = 10 7 , F = 45, Q = 2, θ ∼ U [0, 250], Φ = 0.3, K = 23, and B = 5. In Fig. 5 (c) and Fig. 5(d) , we show the comparison between Π SAR , Π SUR , and Π SURD under different degrees of the wear-out effect.
In Fig. 5(c) , we consider a large wear-out effect (A = 0.9). The comparison between Π SAR and Π SUR (or Π SURD ) is similar to those in Fig. 5(a) and Fig. 5(b) . The SAR scheme achieves a higher revenue than the SUR scheme when C is large. Comparing Π SUR and Π SURD in Fig. 5(c) , we observe that differentiation improves the operator's revenue under the SUR scheme by at most 9.9%.
In Fig. 5(d) , we consider a small wear-out effect (A = 0.2), and have three observations. First, Π SAR may not change with C, which is different from the logarithmic utility situation shown in Fig. 5(a) . When each user has an exponential utility, the operator may not benefit from the increase of C, since it may not use up the capacity for the rewards (as discussed in Section III-C). Second, Π SAR is always no greater than Π SUR (even under a large C), which is different from the logarithmic utility situation and the generalized α-fair utility situation. Under the SAR scheme, each user has to pay the subscription fee F > 0 before receiving the data rewards. The exponential utility function is upper bounded (i.e., u (z) = 1 − e −γz ≤ 1), and hence the users with θ < F will never subscribe and watch ads under the SAR scheme, regardless of the unit data reward ω. When A is small, the advertisers are willing to buy more slots, and having more users watching ads significantly increases the operator's revenue. Therefore, the SUR scheme, which can motivate the users with θ < F to watch ads, achieves a higher revenue than the SAR scheme. Third, the Π SURD curve overlaps the Π SUR curve, because the operator chooses a large ω to incentivize the users to watch ads under a small A. In this situation, all the ad slots are generated by non-subscribers under the SUR scheme (see Casê D of Proposition 5), and the differentiation cannot improve the operator's revenue.
We summarize the key observations below. (c) Exponential Utility (Large A). SAR scheme if and only if C is below a finite threshold; (ii) under a small A, the SUR scheme always achieves a higher operator revenue than the SAR scheme.
B. Truncated Normally Distributed User Types
We next assume that each user's type θ follows a truncated normal distribution. We show that most observations under the uniformly distributed user types still hold.
1) Logarithmic Utility Function: We assume that u (z) = ln (1 + z), and obtain the distribution of θ by truncating the normal distribution N (75, 40) to interval [0, 150]. We choose N = 10 7 , F = 40, Q = 2, Φ = 0.03, K = 8, A = 0.5, and B = 10. In Fig. 7(a) , we plot Π SAR , Π SUR , and Π SURD against C. We can see that the SUR scheme outperforms the SAR scheme if and only if C is below a threshold. This is consistent with Observation 1.
2) Generalized α-Fair Utility Function: We next assume that u (z) = (z+µ) 1−α 1−α − µ 1−α 1−α , where α = 0.8 and µ = 0.8. The other settings are the same as those in Fig. 7(a) . We plot the operator's optimal revenues under different schemes in Fig.  7(b) . The influence of C on the comparison is consistent with Observation 2.
3) Exponential Utility Function: We next assume that u (z) = 1−e −γz , and obtain the distribution of θ by truncating the normal distribution N (125, 30) to interval [0, 250]. We choose γ = 0.7, N = 10 7 , F = 40, Q = 2, Φ = 0.5, K = 16, and B = 5. Fig. 7(c) and Fig. 7(d) show the comparison between Π SAR , Π SUR , and Π SURD under A = 0.9 and A = 0.2, respectively. Fig. 7(c) shows that if the wear-out effect is large, the SUR scheme outperforms the SAR scheme under a small C. Fig. 7(d) shows that if the wear-out effect is small, the SUR scheme always outperforms the SAR scheme. These results are consistent with Observation 3.
In Fig. 7(c) , when C = 2.07 × 10 7 , the differentiation of the ad slots improves the operator's revenue under the SUR scheme by 20.3%. To explain this large improvement, we illustrate the distributions ofŷ I andŷ II under C = 2.07 × 10 7 and the SUR scheme in Fig. 6(b) . We can observe that the difference between the two distributions is greater than that in Fig. 6 (a) (where each user has a logarithmic utility function and a uniformly distributed type). For example, the value of Fig. 6(b) is around 5.7, and the value of E[ŷI] E[ŷII] in Fig.  6 (a) is around 2.9. 14 Intuitively, when the difference between the subscribers' and non-subscribers' ad watching behaviors is larger, the benefit of differentiation is more obvious. Therefore, the improvement of Π SURD over Π SUR in Fig. 7(c) is greater than the improvement in Fig. 5 (a) (which is 9.4%).
VI. CONCLUSION
Mobile data rewarding is an emerging approach to monetize mobile services. We modeled the data rewarding ecosystem and analyzed an operator's rewarding scheme. Our results reveal that: (i) increasing the unit data reward may decrease the number of ads watched by the users, and the operator may not use up its network capacity to reward the users; (ii) under the SUR scheme, the operator can improve its revenue by differentiating the ad slots generated by the subscribers and non-subscribers; (iii) the operator's optimal choice between the SAR and SUR schemes is sensitive to the user utility function, network capacity, and advertising's wear-out effect.
In future work, we plan to first study the operator's joint optimization of the data plan and the data rewards. Under the SAR scheme, the operator can reduce the subscription fee to motivate more users to subscribe and watch ads. Under the SUR scheme, the operator may increase the subscription fee, which (i) extracts more revenue from the users with high θ and (ii) pushes more users with low θ to become non-subscribers and watch ads. Second, we are interested in relaxing the assumptions of a monopolistic operator and homogeneous advertisers. For example, when there are multiple operators, they will compete for users as well as advertisers, which may increase the unit data rewards and reduce the ad prices. Third, we can study a general data rewarding scheme where the operator can set different unit data rewards for the subscribers and non-subscribers. The SAR and SUR schemes can be treated as two special cases of this general scheme. 
First, we compute its derivative. Note that we have u (u )
Next, we apply the chain rule to compute dh(θ) dθ . After the cancellation of the same terms, we get the following result:
Note that function u (·) is strictly concave and lim z→∞ u (z) = 0. This implies that u (·) is a strictly decreasing function. As a result, (u ) −1 (·), which is the inverse function of u (·), is also a strictly decreasing function. Based on this result and the fact that u (·) is a strictly increasing function, we can see that dh(θ) dθ is strictly increasing in θ. Furthermore, when θ = θ 1 = Φ ωu (Q) , the value of
Since u (0) = 0, Q > 0, and u (·) is strictly increasing, we can conclude that dh(θ) dθ | θ=θ1 > 0. Hence, dh(θ) dθ > 0 for θ ≥ θ 1 = Φ ωu (Q) . Second, we compute h (θ 1 ). By substituting 
Probability density function of θ u (·)
A user's utility function Π user (θ, r, x, ω) A type-θ user's payoff function N ad (ω)
Mass of users who watch ads (i.e., with x * (θ, ω) > 0) Π ad (m, ω, p)
An advertiser's payoff function R data (ω)
Operator's revenue from data market R ad (ω, p)
Operator's ad revenue R total (ω, p)
Operator's total revenue D (ω)
Total data demand Other Notations Π SAR Operator's optimal total revenue under SAR scheme Π SUR , Π SURD Operator's optimal total revenues under SUR scheme. Π SUR : no ad slot differentiation; Π SURD : with ad slot differentiation.
When ω > Φu(Q) F u (Q) , we can see that h (θ 1 ) < 0.
Third, we compute h (θ 0 ). By substituting θ 0 = F u(Q) into h (θ), we have
Next, we compare h (θ 0 ) with 0. We define a new function ∆ (F ) as follows:
We can compute ∆ Φu(Q)
Then, we analyze d∆(F ) dF . We compute d∆(F ) dF as follows:
Recall that u (·) is strictly increasing and (u )
F u (Q) , we have proved that dh(θ) dθ > 0 for θ ≥ θ 1 , h (θ 1 ) < 0, and h (θ 0 ) > 0. Hence, there exists a unique θ 2 ∈ (θ 1 , θ 0 ) satisfying h (θ 2 ) = 0.
APPENDIX C PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Proof.
Step 1: We analyze Case A, i.e., ω ∈ 0, Φ u (Q)θmax . Suppose a type-θ user subscribes to the data plan, i.e., r = 1.
Since u (·) is a strictly decreasing function, we have u (Q + ωx) < u (Q) for x > 0. Hence, ∂Π user (θ,1,x,ω) ∂x < 0 for x > 0. This implies that if a user subscribes to the data plan, it will not watch any ad for rewards. In this case, the user's payoff is θu (Q) − F .
Suppose a type-θ user does not subscribe, i.e., r = 0. Under the SAR scheme, the user cannot watch ads for the rewards. Hence, its payoff is 0.
Comparing θu (Q) − F and 0, we can see that a user subscribes if and only if θ ≥ θ 0 = F u(Q) . Moreover, a user with any θ ∈ [0, θ max ] will not watch ads. That is to say, we have
Step 2: We analyze Case B, i.e., ω ∈ Φ u (Q)θmax , Φu(Q) F u (Q) . Suppose a type-θ user subscribes to the data plan, i.e., r = 1. Its payoff is Π user (θ, 1, x, ω) = θu (Q + ωx) − F − Φx. By checking ∂Π user (θ,1,x,ω) ∂x , we can see the following result:
, the user will not watch ads (i.e., x = 0), and its payoff will be θu (Q) − F ;
Then, we can see that the user's payoff satisfies
Since
Suppose a type-θ user does not subscribe, i.e., r = 0. Under the SAR scheme, the user cannot watch ads for the rewards and its payoff is 0.
Next, we can compare the choices of r = 1 and r = 0. Recall that Φ ωu (Q) ≥ F u(Q) . We discuss the choices of users with θ ∈ 0, F u(Q) , θ ∈ F u(Q) , Φ ωu (Q) , and θ ∈ Φ ωu (Q) , θ max , separately. If θ ∈ 0, F u(Q) , the user has a higher payoff under r = 0. As discussed above, it cannot watch ads. If θ ∈ F u(Q) , Φ ωu (Q) , the user has a higher payoff under r = 1, and it will not watch ads. If θ ∈ Φ ωu (Q) , θ max , the user has a higher payoff under r = 1, and it will choose
and θ 1 = Φ ωu (Q) . We can conclude that the following result holds for θ ∈ [0, θ max ]:
Step 3: We analyze Case C, i.e., ω ∈ Φu(Q) F u (Q) , ∞ . Suppose a type-θ user subscribes to the data plan, i.e., r = 1. Its payoff is Π user (θ, 1, x, ω) = θu (Q + ωx) − F − Φx. By checking ∂Π user (θ,1,x,ω) ∂x , we can see the following result:
The user's correspond-ing payoff is given by
Next, we can compare the choices of r = 1 and r = 0.
, the user has a higher payoff under r = 0, and it cannot watch ads. If θ ∈ Φ ωu (Q) , θ 2 , we can see the following relation based on our proof in Appendix B:
The left side is the value of Π user (θ, 1, x, ω) in (35) . The inequality implies that the user has a higher payoff under r = 0. In this case, it cannot watch ads. If θ ∈ [θ 2 , θ max ], we can see the following relation based on our proof in Appendix B:
This implies that the user has a higher payoff under r = 1.
In this case, it chooses x = 1 ω (u )
We can conclude that the following result holds for θ ∈ [0, θ max ]:
Hence, we have proved r * (θ, ω) and x * (θ, ω) for Case A, Case B, and Case C.
APPENDIX D θ 2 'S MONOTONICITY WITH RESPECT TO ω
We prove that in Case C, θ 2 decreases as ω increases.
Proof. Based on θ 2 's definition, we have
For both sides of the equation, we take their derivatives with respect to ω, and get equation (39) . After rearrangement, we have the following equation:
Hence, we can get the expression of dθ2 dω as follows:
Based on θ 2 's definition, we have θ 2 > θ 1 = Φ ωu (Q) . Recall that (u ) −1 (·) is strictly decreasing. We can see that
As a result, the value
is negative, and the value of
is positive. Therefore, we can conclude that dθ2 dω < 0.
APPENDIX E PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Proof. First, we consider the case where N ad (ω) = 0, i.e., the mass of users watching ads is zero. Based on the advertiser payoff's definition, Π ad (m, ω, p) = −mp. Since p > 0, none of the advertisers will purchase the ad slots, i.e., m * (ω, p) = 0.
Second, we consider the case where N ad (ω) > 0. An advertiser's payoff is
After rearrangement, we have
which is a quadratic function of m ≥ 0. We can easily see that 
APPENDIX F EXAMPLE OF COMPUTING m * (ω, p)
In this section, we assume that each user has a logarithmic utility function, i.e., u (z) = ln (1 + z), and a uniformly distributed type, i.e., θ ∼ U [0, θ max ]. We compute the value of N ad (ω), the distribution of y, and the expression of m * (ω, p) when ω satisfies Case A, Case B, and Case C.
Step 1: We consider Case A. Since u (z) = ln (1 + z), the condition of ω in Case A becomes ω ∈ 0, (1+Q)Φ θmax . In this case, there is no user watching ads. Hence, N ad (ω) = 0. From Proposition 2, we have m * (ω, p) = 0.
Step 2: We consider Case B. Since u (z) = ln (1 + z), the condition of ω in Case B becomes ω ∈ (1+Q)Φ θmax , Φ F (1 + Q) ln (1 + Q) . Based on Proposition 1, the users' ad watching decisions in Case B are characterized by the following equation:
Here, equality (a) is due to u (z) = ln (1 + z), and equality (b) is due to
in Case B. Hence, only the users with θ ≥ θ 1 watch ads. Because θ ∼ U [0, θ max ], we can compute N ad (ω) as follows:
Moreover, according to (46) and the fact that θ ∼ U [0, θ max ], we can see that the number of ads watched by one of the N ad (ω) users is uniformly distributed in 0, θmax−θ1 Φ . This implies that y is uniformly distributed in 0, θmax−θ1 Φ . Then, we can compute E [y] and E y 2 as follows:
Based on Proposition 2, we can derive m * (ω, p)'s expression as
Step 3: We consider Case C. Since u (z) = ln (1 + z), the condition of ω in Case C becomes ω ∈ Φ F (1 + Q) ln (1 + Q) , ∞ . Based on Proposition 1, the users' ad watching decisions in Case C are characterized by the following equation:
Hence, only the users with θ ≥ θ 2 watch ads. Because θ ∼ U [0, θ max ], we can compute N ad (ω) as follows:
Moreover, according to (50) and the fact that θ ∼ U [0, θ max ], we can see that the number of ads watched by one of the N ad (ω) users is uniformly distributed in θ2−θ1 Φ , θmax−θ1 Φ . This means that y is uniformly distributed in θ2−θ1 Φ , θmax−θ1 Φ . Then, we can compute E [y] and E y 2 as follows:
To simplify the presentation, we let λ a θ 2 − θ 1 and λ b θ max − θ 1 . We can further have the following result:
This completes our analysis of m * (ω, p) under three cases when u (z) = ln (1 + z) and θ ∼ U [0, θ max ].
APPENDIX G PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof. First, we consider the case where ω ∈ 0, Φ u (Q)θmax . According to Proposition 1, no user watches ads, i.e., N ad (ω) = 0. From Proposition 2, we can see that m * (ω, p) = 0 for any p > 0. This means that the operator's ad revenue R ad (ω, p) is zero, regardless of the ad price. Hence, all positive prices lead to the same ad revenue, and any positive price is optimal.
Second, we consider the case where ω ∈ Φ u (Q)θmax , ∞ . From Proposition 1, the number of users watching ads is positive, i.e., N ad (ω) > 0. If p ≥ B, the value of m * (ω, p) is zero based on Proposition 2. In this situation, the value of R ad (ω, p) is also zero. If p < B, we have m * (ω, p) =
Then, when ω is given, the operator's problem of deciding p can be rewritten as follows:
After rearrangement, the problem becomes:
The objective function is quadratic in p and achieves the maximum value at p = B 2 . Hence, we can see that the optimal price under a given ω is given by
APPENDIX H PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
Step 1: We analyze the monotonicity of D (ω) in three cases.
First, when ω ∈ 0, Φ u (Q)θmax , the value of D (ω) is given by
Second, when ω ∈ Φ u (Q)θmax , Φu(Q) F u (Q) , the expression of D (ω) is given by
Based on Leibniz's rule, we can further compute dD(ω) dω as follows:
From our proof in Lemma 1, function (u ) −1 (·) is strictly decreasing. Hence,
is positive. This implies that dD(ω) dω is positive.
Third, when ω ∈ Φu(Q) F u (Q) , ∞ , the expression of D (ω) is given by
We can further compute dD(ω) dω as follows:
From our proof in Appendix D, we have dθ2 dω < 0. Hence, the first term in the right side of (65) is positive. Since function
Hence, the second term in the right side of (65) is positive. Furthermore, from the definition of θ 2 , we have θ 2 > θ 1 = Φ ωu (Q) . As a result, the value of (u )
dω < 0, the third term in the right side of (65) is positive. Based on the above analysis, we can see that 
From (61), we can see that this equals
Based on (61), we can also see that
Then, we analyze the continuity of D (ω) at ω = Φu(Q) F u (Q) . Recall that θ 0 = F u(Q) and θ 1 = Φ ωu (Q) . We can see that
According to the definition of θ 2 , we have θ 2 ∈ (θ 1 , θ 0 ). Hence, we have the relation that lim ω Φu(Q) .
(66)
From (62), we can also see that lim ω Φu(Q)
. Therefore, D (ω) is continuous at ω = Φu(Q) F u (Q) . The above analysis shows that D (ω) is continuous for ω ≥ 0.
Step 3: We prove that lim ω→∞ D (ω) = ∞. First, we analyze lim ω→∞ (u ) −1 Φ ωθ . Recall that u (·) is strictly concave and lim z→∞ u (z) = 0. We can see that as z increases from 0 to ∞, the value of u (z) strictly decreases from u (0) to 0. Hence, asẑ increases from 0 to u (0), the value of (u ) −1 (ẑ) strictly decreases from ∞ to 0. Hence, we have limẑ →0 (u ) −1 (ẑ) = ∞. This implies the following relation:
When ω > Φu(Q) F u (Q) , we can derive the following inequality from (64):
Recall that θ 0 = F u(Q) , which is independent of ω. From (67), we can see that when ω → ∞, the right side of (68) approaches infinity. Therefore, we have lim ω→∞ D (ω) = ∞.
So far, we have shown that (i) D (ω) is continuous in ω ∈ [0, ∞); (ii) D (ω) does not change with ω for ω ∈ 0, Φ u (Q)θmax , and strictly increases with ω for ω ∈ Φ u (Q)θmax , ∞ ; (iii) when ω approaches infinity, D (ω) approaches infinity. Therefore, we can conclude that given
Furthermore, this ω strictly increases with C.
APPENDIX I PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Step 1: We analyze the case where C = D (0). From constraint D (ω) ≤ C, we can see that ω needs to satisfy 0 ≤ ω ≤ Φ u (Q)θmax . Based on Proposition 1, no user watches ads in this case. As a result, the value of N ad (ω) is zero. From Proposition 2, the value of m * (ω, p) is also zero. Based on (14)-(16), we can easily see that the operator's problem of deciding ω becomes:
where R data (ω) equals N F θmax F u(Q) g (θ) dθ and is independent of ω. Therefore, when C = D (0), any ω from set 0, Φ u (Q)θmax is optimal. Next, we show that when C = D (0), the value of D −1 (C) is in the set 0, 
Therefore, the value of D −1 (C) is in the set 0, Φ u (Q)θmax , and ω = D −1 (C) is one optimal solution to the operator's problem.
Step 2: We analyze the case where C > D (0). First, we prove that ω * should lie in the interval according to Theorem 1. Then, we can easily verify that the operator's revenue from the data market is no less than N F θmax F u(Q) g (θ) dθ and its ad revenue is positive. As a result, when C > D (0), the value of ω * should be in the interval Φ u (Q)θmax , D −1 (C) .
Since ω * ∈ Φ u (Q)θmax , D −1 (C) , we can utilize Proposition 2 to simplify the operator's optimization problem as follows:
We prove ω * = D −1 (C) by contradiction. Suppose that ω * < D −1 (C) and the corresponding ad price is p * (ω * ). Next, we prove that we can find (ω, p) that is feasible and generates a higher total revenue than (ω * , p * (ω * )).
Since ω * < D −1 (C), we letω be a value in ω * , D −1 (C) . When the unit data reward isω, the number of users watching ads is N ad (ω). We use a random variableỹ to denote the number of ads watched by one of these N ad (ω) users under the unit data rewardω. Then, we can choosep to satisfy the following equation:
Here, we use a random variable y * to denote the number of ads watched by one of the users choosing to watch ads under the unit data reward ω * .
Next, we prove that (ω,p) satisfies constraint (70). Based on the feasibility of solution (ω * , p * (ω * )), the following inequality holds:
One condition of Theorem 2 is that E [y] N ad (ω) increases with ω for ω > Φ u (Q)θmax . Fromω > ω * , we have the following relation:
Based on (73) and (74), we have the following result:
From the above inequality and (72), we can derive the follow-ing relation:
This implies that (ω,p) satisfies constraint (70). Then, we prove that (ω,p) generates a larger objective value than (ω * , p * (ω * )). One condition of Theorem 2 is that
From ω > ω * , we have the following relation:
Based on this inequality and (72), we can see that
Fromp > p * (ω * ) and (72), we can see that the ad revenue under (ω,p) is greater than that under (ω * , p * (ω * )):
Moreover, from Proposition 1 andω > ω * , the number of subscribers under unit rewardω is no less than the number of subscribers under unit reward ω * . This implies that R data (ω) ≥ R data (ω * ). Combining (79) and R data (ω) ≥ R data (ω * ), we can conclude that (ω,p) generates a larger objective value than (ω * , p * (ω * )). Therefore, we have proved that (i) (ω,p) is feasible and (ii) (ω,p) generates a larger objective value than (ω * , p * (ω * )). This contradicts with the assumption that (ω * , p * (ω * )) is the optimal solution. As a result, when the two conditions in Theorem 2 hold, ω * should equal D −1 (C).
According to our results in Step 1 and Step 2, when the two conditions in Theorem 2 hold, the optimal unit data reward is given by ω * = D −1 (C).
APPENDIX J PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
Proof. We prove that when u (z) = ln (1 + z) and θ ∼
Step 1: We consider the case where ω ∈ Φ u (Q)θmax , Φu(Q) F u (Q) . Based on our analysis in Appendix F, when u (z) = ln (1 + z) and θ ∼ U [0, θ max ], we have the following results:
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(85)
To simplify the presentation, we let y h θmax−θ1 Φ and y l θ2−θ1 Φ . Based on the relation y 3 h − y 3 l = y 2 l + y 2 h + y l y h (y h − y l ), we can derive the following equation:
We can compute the derivative of (y 2
l with respect to ω as follows:
From our analysis in Appendix D, we have dθ2 dω < 0. Moreover, we have y h > y l . We can see that the above derivative is positive. Therefore, (E[y]) 2 E[y 2 ] N ad (ω) increases with ω. Then, we can compute E [y] N ad (ω) as follows:
The derivative with respect to ω is computed as
Since θ max > θ 2 > θ 1 , dθ1 dω < 0, and dθ2 dω < 0, we can see that E [y] N ad (ω) increases with ω.
Combing Step 1 and Step 2, we can see that when and E [y] N ad (ω) increase with ω for ω ∈ Φ u (Q)θmax , ∞ . According to Theorem 2, the optimal unit data reward is given by ω * = D −1 (C).
APPENDIX K EXAMPLE
We use a numerical example to show that when each user has an exponential utility function, it is possible that E [y] N ad (ω) (i.e., the number of available ad slots) decreases with ω and ω * < D −1 (C).
We assume that u (z) = 1−e −γz , and obtain the distribution of θ by truncating the normal distribution N (30, 60) to interval [0, 320]. We choose γ = 0.95, N = 10 7 , F = 40, Q = 2, Φ = 0.5, K = 16, A = 0.9, B = 5, and C = 2.15 × 10 7 .
In Fig. 8 , we plot the value of E [y] N ad (ω) against ω (under the SAR scheme). We can see that E [y] N ad (ω) is decreasing in ω ∈ [0.117, 0.217]. Moreover, we can numerically compute that ω * = 0.137 and D (ω * ) = 1.846 × 10 7 . Since D (ω * ) is smaller than C and D (ω) increases with ω under the SAR scheme, we can see that ω * < D −1 (C).
APPENDIX L PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Proof. Let v (θ) = θu (u )
Recall that u (·) is increasing and (u ) −1 (·) is decreasing.
When θ = θ 1 = Φ ωu (Q) , we have dv(θ) dθ = 0; when θ < θ 1 , we can see that dv(θ) dθ < dv(θ) dθ | θ=θ1 = 0. Second, since θ 3 = Φ ωu (0) , we can compute v (θ 3 ) as follows:
When
Third, we compute v (θ 1 ) as follows:
When ω < ΦQ F , we can see that v (θ 1 ) < 0. Hence, when ω ∈ Φu(Q) F u (0) , ΦQ F , we have dv(θ) dθ < 0 for θ < θ 1 , v (θ 3 ) > 0, and v (θ 1 ) < 0. Moreover, we have dv(θ) dθ | θ=θ1 = 0. We can conclude that there exists a unique θ 4 ∈ (θ 3 , θ 1 ) satisfying v (θ 4 ) = 0.
APPENDIX M PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
Step 1: We analyze CaseÂ, i.e., ω ∈ 0, Φ u (Q)θmax . Suppose a type-θ user subscribes to the data plan, i.e., r = 1. Its payoff is Π user (θ, 1, x, ω) = θu (Q + ωx) − F − Φx. We can see that
Suppose a type-θ user does not subscribe, i.e., r = 0. Its payoff is Π user (θ, 0, x, ω) = θu (ωx) − Φx. We can see that
Hence, if θ ∈ Φ ωu (0) , θ max , the user will watch ads with
ωθ , and its payoff will be θu (u )
ωθ ; otherwise, the user will not watch ads, and its payoff will be zero.
Next, we compare the choices of r = 1 and r = 0. Recall that we assume θ max > u (0)F u (Q)u(Q) in Section II-D. Hence,
Consider a user with θ ∈ 0, F u(Q) . As we discussed above, if it subscribes, it will not watch ads and its payoff will be θu (Q) − F . Since θ < F u(Q) , this payoff is negative. If it does not subscribe, since θ < F u(Q) < Φ ωu (0) , it will not watch ads and its payoff will be zero. Comparing r = 0 and r = 1, this user will not subscribe or watch ads, i.e.,r * (θ, ω) = 0 and x * (θ, ω) = 0.
Consider a user with θ ∈ F u(Q) , Φ ωu (0) . As we discussed above, if it subscribes, it will not watch ads and its payoff will be θu (Q) − F . Since θ ≥ F u(Q) , this payoff is non-negative. If it does not subscribe, since θ < Φ ωu (0) , it will not watch ads and its payoff will be zero. Comparing r = 0 and r = 1, this user will subscribe without watching any ad, i.e.,r * (θ, ω) = 1 andx * (θ, ω) = 0.
Consider a user with θ ∈ Φ ωu (0) , θ max . As we discussed above, if it subscribes, it will not watch ads and its payoff will be θu (Q) − F . If it does not subscribe, it will watch ads and its payoff will be θu (u )
ωθ . Next, we compare these two payoffs. We define
From u (u )
we can compute the derivative of s (θ) as follows:
as follows:
, the value of s (θ) is positive. This implies that the user should subscribe as it achieves a higher payoff. Hence, we haver * (θ, ω) = 1 andx * (θ, ω) = 0.
Combining the above three regions of θ, we can conclude that (note that θ 0 = F u(Q) )
Step 2: We analyze CaseB, i.e., ω ∈ Φ u (Q)θmax , Φu(Q) F u (0) . Suppose a type-θ user subscribes to the data plan, i.e., r = 1. Its payoff is Π user (θ, 1, x, ω) = θu (Q + ωx) − F − Φx. We can see that
Then, we can see that the user's payoff is
Next, we compare the choices of r = 1 and r = 0. From the concavity of u (·) and lim z→∞ u (z) = 0, we have
. Consider a user with θ ∈ 0, F u(Q) . If this user chooses r = 1, it will not watch ads and its payoff will be θu (Q)−F , which is negative. If this user chooses r = 0, it will not watch ads and its payoff will be zero. Hence, the user will not subscribe or watch ads, i.e.,r * (θ, ω) = 0 andx * (θ, ω) = 0.
Consider a user with θ ∈ F u(Q) , Φ ωu (0) . If this user chooses r = 1, it will not watch ads and its payoff will be θu (Q) − F , which is non-negative. If this user chooses r = 0, it will not watch ads and its payoff will be zero. Hence, the user will subscribe without watching ads, i.e.,r * (θ, ω) = 1 andx * (θ, ω) = 0.
Consider a user with θ ∈ Φ ωu (0) , Φ ωu (Q) . If this user chooses r = 1, it will not watch ads and its payoff will be θu (Q) − F , which is non-negative. If this user chooses r = 0, it will watch ads and its payoff will be θu (u )
ωθ . Next we compare these two payoffs. We can see that the difference between these two payoffs is captured by s (θ) defined in (95). Based on our analysis in Step 1, we can see that when θ < Φ ωu (Q) , we have ds(θ) dθ > 0 and
. This implies that the user should subscribe without watching ads, i.e.,r * (θ, ω) = 1 and x * (θ, ω) = 0.
Consider a user with θ ∈ Φ ωu (Q) , θ max . If this user chooses r = 1, it will watch ads and its payoff will be θu (u )
If this user chooses r = 0, it will watch ads and its payoff will be θu (u )
ωθ . Next we compare this two payoffs. We can see that the difference between these two payoffs is −F + ΦQ ω . We first analyze the value of u (Q)−u (0) Q. We can easily see that the following equation holds:
From u (0) = 0 and the strict concavity of u (·), we have u (Q) − u (0) Q < 0. Then, since ω ≤ Φu(Q) F u (0) in CaseB, we have ω < ΦQ F . Recall that the difference in the two payoffs is ΦQ ω − F . We can see that the user can get a higher payoff by subscription and watching ads, i.e.,r * (θ, ω) = 1 and
Combining the above four regions of θ, we can conclude that the following result holds for θ ∈ [0, θ max ] (recall that θ 0 = F u(Q) and θ 1 = Φ ωu (Q) ):
Step 3: We analyze CaseĈ, i.e., ω ∈ Φu(Q) F u (0) , ΦQ F . Suppose a type-θ user subscribes to the data plan, i.e., r = 1. Based on our prior analysis in Step 2, we have the following results:
(i) If θ ∈ 0, Φ ωu (Q) , the user will not watch ads (i.e., x = 0), and its payoff will be θu (Q) − F ;
. Suppose a type-θ user does not subscribe, i.e., r = 0. Based on our prior analysis in Step 2, we have the following results:
(i) If θ ∈ 0, Φ ωu (0) , the user will not watch ads, and its payoff will be zero.
(ii) If θ ∈ Φ ωu (0) , θ max , the user will watch ads with
ωθ . Next, we compare the choices of r = 1 and r = 0. Since ω > Φu(Q) F u (0) , we have Φ ωu (0) < F u(Q) . Based on our analysis in Appendix L, when ω ∈ Φu(Q) F u (0) , ΦQ F , there is a unique
Consider a user with θ ∈ 0, Φ ωu (0) . If this user chooses r = 1, it will not watch ads and its payoff will be θu (Q) − F , which is negative due to θ < Φ ωu (0) < F u(Q) . If this user chooses r = 0, it will not watch ads and its payoff will be zero. Hence, the user will not subscribe or watch ads, i.e., r * (θ, ω) = 0 andx * (θ, ω) = 0.
Consider a user with θ ∈ Φ ωu (0) , θ 4 . If this user chooses r = 1, it will not watch ads (due to θ 4 < Φ ωu (Q) ) and its payoff will be θu (Q) − F . If this user chooses r = 0, it will watch ads and its payoff will be θu (u )
ωθ . Next, we compare these two payoffs. In Appendix L, we have proved that function v (θ) = θu (u )
and its value is zero when θ = θ 4 . Therefore, when θ < θ 4 , we have v (θ) > 0. After rearrangement, we have θu (u )
This implies that the user will not subscribe but it will watch ads, i.e.,r * (θ, ω) = 0 andx * (θ, ω) = 1 ω (u )
. Compared with the user with θ ∈ Φ ωu (Q) , θ 4 , the only difference here is the comparison between θu (u )
and θu (Q) − F . Based on our analysis of v (θ) in Appendix L, we can see that v (θ) ≤ 0 for θ ≥ θ 4 . Hence, we have θu (u )
This implies that the user will subscribe without watching ads, i.e., r * (θ, ω) = 1 andx * (θ, ω) = 0.
When ω < ΦQ F , the former payoff is greater. That is to say, the user should subscribe and watch ads, i.e.,r * (θ, ω)
Combining the above four regions of θ, we can conclude the following result. For θ ∈ [0, θ max ], we have (recall that
Step 4: We analyze CaseD, i.e., ω ≥ ΦQ F . Note that the cost of getting a unit data by subscription is F Q , and the "cost" of getting a unit data by watching ads is Φ ω (i.e., the disutility of watching one ad over the corresponding data reward). When ω ≥ ΦQ F , we have F Q ≥ Φ ω . This implies that a user should never consider the subscription, since the user can always watch ads to win the same amount of data but incur a total cost that is no greater than that under the subscription. Hence, we haver * (θ, ω) = 0 for θ ∈ [0, θ max ].
Now we can write a type-θ user's payoff as Π user (θ, 0, x, ω) = θu (ωx) − Φx. We can see that
Hence, if θ ∈ 0, Φ ωu (0) , the user will not watch ads; otherwise, it will watch ads with x = 1 ω (u )
That is to say, we have the following result for θ ∈ [0, θ max ] (recall that θ 3 = Φ ωu (0) ):
Hence, we have provedr * (θ, ω) andx * (θ, ω) for CaseÂ, CaseB, CaseĈ, and CaseD. APPENDIX N PROOF OF LEMMA 3 Proof.
Step 1: We first prove that when ω ∈ Φu(Q) F u (0) , ΦQ F , the relation that θ 4 > θ 0 holds.
Based on our analysis in Appendix L, if we let v (θ) = θu (u )
Now we check the value of v (θ 0 ). We can see that
When ω = Φu(Q) F u (0) , the value of (u ) 
u(Q) . We can rewrite Qu (Q) u(Q) as follows:
From u (0) = 0 and the strict concavity of u (·), we have
The value of θ0 θ1 is less than 1, i.e., θ 0 is smaller than θ 1 .
So far, we have shown the following results. First, both θ 0 and θ 4 are smaller than θ 1 . Second, v (θ) is decreasing for θ < θ 1 . Third, v (θ 0 ) > 0 and v (θ 4 ) = 0. It is easy to see that θ 0 < θ 4 .
Step 2: We prove that in CaseĈ, θ 4 increases as ω increases.
Based on θ 4 's definition, we have
For both sides of the equation, we take their derivatives with respect to ω. Since u (u )
After rearrangement, we can see that
Since θ 4 > θ 3 = Φ ωu (0) , we have (u )
APPENDIX O PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Step 1: We prove that when C > N (u )
is a decreasing function and θ max > u (0)F u (Q)u(Q) (our assumption in Section II-D), we can derive the following inequality:
Then, we analyze the value of u(Q) u (0)Q . The fraction can be rewritten as follows:
Since u (0) = 0 and u (·) is a strict increasing and concave function, we can see that u(Q) u (0)Q < 1. Based on this inequality and (111), we have the following result:
Therefore, when C > N (u ) −1 F θmaxQ , we also have C > N Q.
Next, we analyze the values ofD (ω) in CaseÂ, CaseB, and CaseĈ. When ω ∈ 0, Φ u (Q)θmax , we can computeD (ω) as follows:D
Since θmax θ0 g (θ) dθ < 1 and C > N Q, the value ofD (ω) is
When ω ∈ Φ u (Q)θmax , Φu(Q) F u (0) , we can computeD (ω) as follows:
As proved above, we have u(Q) u (0)Q < 1.
Since ω ≤ Φu(Q) F u (0) , we can see that ω < ΦQ F . Moreover, (u ) −1 (·) is decreasing and θ ≤ θ max . We can get the relation that (u )
Qθmax . Based on this relation and (115), we can derive the following inequality:
Here, inequality (a) is due to (113). Hence, we have shown that the value ofD (ω) is smaller than
, we can computeD (ω) as follows:
Based on a similar discussion as that after (115), we can prove that (u )
Qθmax . Then, we have the following result:
From this inequality, (113), and C > N (u ) −1 F θmaxQ , we can see that the value ofD (ω) is smaller than C.
Combing our analysis for the cases where ω ∈ 0,
Step 2: We prove that when A >
When ω ∈ ΦQ F , ∞ , all users watch ads without subscription. In this case, the operator's revenue only consists of the ad revenue. We can compute the operator's revenue as follows:
R total (ω,p * (ω)) =R ad (ω,p * (ω)) = Km * (ω,p * (ω))p * (ω)
Note
is the variance ofŷ. Moreover, since B−p * (ω) 2Ap * (ω) is quadratic in p * (ω), we have the following relation:
Based on the above inequality, (E[ŷ]) 2 E[ŷ 2 ] ≤ 1, andN ad (ω) ≤ N , we can derive the following inequality:
Hence, when ω ∈ ΦQ F , ∞ , the value ofR total (ω,p * (ω)) is upper bounded by B 2 K 8A N . Next, we analyze the lower bound ofR total (ω,p * (ω))
F u (0) . In this case, the operator's ad revenue (i.e.,R ad (ω,p * (ω))) and the revenue from the data market (i.e.,R data (ω)) are positive. We can derive the following relation:
g(θ)dθ , the right side of (122) is greater than the right side of (121). This implies that the optimal unit rewardω * / ∈ ΦQ F , ∞ . In other words, the value ofω * lies in interval 0, ΦQ F .
Combining
Step 1 and Step 2, we can conclude that D (ω * ) < C.
APPENDIX P PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Proof. Recall that Π SURD is the optimal objective value of problem (20)- (23) , and Π SUR is the optimal objective value of problem (18)- (19) . Suppose that (ω, p) is a feasible solution to (18)- (19) . To prove that Π SURD ≥ Π SUR , we can simply show that for any (ω, p), we are able to find a corresponding (ω, p I , p II ) such that (i) (ω, p I , p II ) is feasible to problem (20)-(23) and (ii) the value of objective (20) under (ω, p I , p II ) equals the value of (18) under (ω, p).
Note that when ω satisfies CaseÂ, CaseB, or CaseD, the subscribers and non-subscribers will not simultaneously choose to watch ads. In this situation, the operator cannot differentiate ad slots based on the subscription decisions of the users watching ads. As we mentioned in Section IV-D, problem (18)- (19) and problem (20)-(23) are the same. For example, when ω satisfies CaseB, only the subscribers watch ads. Then, bothN ad II (ω) andm * II (ω, p II ) are zeros. This allows us to remove the term Km * II (ω, p II ) p II in objective (20) and also ignore constraint (23) . We can see that problem (20)-(23) reduces to problem (18)- (19) .
Next, we focus on the situations where ω satisfies CaseĈ. There are two possible situations.
If (ω, p) is a feasible solution to problem (18)- (19) and p ≥ B, we can see thatm * (ω, p) = 0 andR ad (ω, p) = 0, which implies that the operator's total revenue only consists of the revenue from the data market. Then, we can construct a solution (ω, p I , p II ) where p I , p II ≥ B. Under p I and p II , we havem * I (ω, p I ) =m * II (ω, p II ) = 0. We can easily verify that (i) the solution (ω, p I , p II ) is feasible to problem (20)- (23) and (ii) the value of objective (20) under (ω, p I , p II ) equals the value of (18) under (ω, p) (i.e., both values equalR data (ω)).
If (ω, p) is a feasible solution to problem (18)- (19) and p < B, we can construct a solution (ω, p I , p II ) where p I and p II are given by
(124)
Step 1: We can prove that this solution is feasible to problem (20)- (23) . Specifically, since p < B, we can see that p I , p II < B. Moreover, since ω satisfies CaseĈ, we haveN ad I (ω) ,N ad II (ω) > 0. Based on our discussions about m * I (ω, p I ) andm * II (ω, p II ) in Section IV-D, we have the following relations: (x * (θ, ω)) 2 g (θ)dθ
relation:
Then, we substitute the expressions of p I and p II in (123) 
These equations can be derived based on the definitions of these terms and Proposition 5. Specifically, as studied in Proposition 5, users with θ ∈ [θ 1 , θ max ] subscribe and watch ads, and users with θ ∈ [θ 3 , θ 4 ) watch ads without subscription. According to (129) and (125), we can derive the following relation:
Then, we can see that the value of objective (20) under (ω, p I , p II ) equals the value of objective (18) under (ω, p).
Combining Step 1 and Step 2, we can conclude that the optimal objective value of problem (20)- (23) is no less than the optimal objective value of problem (18)- (19) . In other words, we have Π SURD ≥ Π SUR .
APPENDIX Q PROOF OF THEOREM 5
Step 1: We derive the operator's optimal total revenue under the SAR scheme when C approaches infinity.
Based on Proposition 4, under the SAR scheme, the operator's optimal unit reward ω * = D −1 (C). According to our analysis in Appendix H, when ω ∈ Φu(Q) F u (Q) , ∞ , the expression of D (ω) is given by
We can see that lim ω→∞ D (ω) = ∞. Hence, when C → ∞, we have ω * → ∞.
Next, we prove that when ω → ∞, the corresponding θ 2 → 0. According to the defitition of θ 2 , the value of θ 2 is upper bounded by θ 0 and is lower bounded by 0. In Appendix D, we have proved that dθ2 dω < 0 for any given ω. Hence, when ω → ∞, the limit of θ 2 exists. Let ζ ∈ [0, θ 0 ] denote this limit. From θ 2 's definition, when u (z) = ln (1 + z) and θ ∼ U [0, θ max ], θ 2 satisfies the following equation:
When we take ω → ∞ on both sides of the equation, we can see that the equality holds only when ζ = 0. That is to say, when ω → ∞, the corresponding θ 2 → 0.
Based on our analysis in Step 2 of Appendix J, when ω ∈ Φu(Q) F u (Q) , ∞ , the operator's revenue function R total (ω, p * (ω)) is as follows: When ω → ∞, we can verify that θ 1 → 0, y h → θmax Φ , and y l → 0. Then, we can derive the limit of the revenue function under ω → ∞ as follows:
When C → ∞, ω * → ∞. Hence, the operator's optimal revenue under the SAR scheme for C → ∞ is characterized in (142).
Step 2: We discuss the maximum possible value of the operator's total revenue under the SUR scheme. R total (ω,p * (ω)) ≤ θ max − θ 0 θ max N F +p * (ω) (B −p * (ω)) 3K 8A
wherep
We compare the right-hand side of the above inequality with the right-hand side of (142). We can see that the right-hand side of (142) is always larger.
(ii) When ω ∈ Φ ln(1+Q) F , ΦQ F , we have the following relation: 1+η 2ŷmax . Based on this relation, we can verify that the following relation holds:
Therefore, we can see that the right-hand side of (145) is smaller than (142).
(iii) When ω ∈ ΦQ F , ∞ , we have the following relation:
R total (ω,p * (ω)) =p * (ω) (B −p * (ω)) 3K 8A
wherep * (ω) = max B − 4A 3K θmax−θ3 Φ , B 2 . Since θ 3 = Φ ω decreases with ω, we can easily prove thatR total (ω,p * (ω)) increases with ω. We can compute the limit of this revenue function under ω → ∞ as follows:
We compare the right-hand side of the above equation with the right-hand side of (142). We can see that the right-hand side of (142) is always larger.
Combining the above analysis for all cases of ω (including the case where ω → ∞), we can see that the operator's maximum possible total revenue under the SUR scheme is always smaller than the value of the right-hand side of (142). Because the right-hand side of (142) is the operator's optimal total revenue under the SAR when C → ∞, we complete the proof.
APPENDIX R NUMERICAL RESULTS UNDER DIFFERENT SETTINGS
In this section, we show the numerical comparison among Π SAR , Π SUR , and Π SURD under more parameter settings. Similar to Fig. 5(a) , we assume that each user's type θ follows a uniform distribution and u (z) = ln (1 + z). We run experiments under three different parameter settings.
First, we choose N = 10 7 , F = 25, Q = 0.7, θ ∼ U [0, 155], Φ = 0.2, K = 30, A = 0.5, and B = 3. We plot Π SAR , Π SUR , and Π SURD against C in Fig. 9(a) . Second, we choose N = 10 5 , F = 32, Q = 0.6, θ ∼ U [0, 170], Φ = 0.3, K = 18, A = 0.6, and B = 4. We plot Π SAR , Π SUR , and Π SURD against C in Fig. 9(b) .
Third, we choose N = 10 4 , F = 28, Q = 0.6, θ ∼ U [0, 150], Φ = 0.2, K = 18, A = 0.4, and B = 3. We plot Π SAR , Π SUR , and Π SURD against C in Fig. 9(c) .
We can see that our key observations in Fig. 5 (a) also hold in Fig. 9(a) , 9(b), and 9(c). For example, if C is small, the SUR scheme achieves a higher operator's revenue; otherwise, the SAR scheme achieves a higher operator's revenue. The ad slots' differentiation can improve the operator's revenue under the SUR scheme.
